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What is Islamophobia? Disentangling Citizens’
Feelings Toward Ethnicity, Religion and Religiosity
Using a Survey Experiment
MARC HELBLING AND RICHARD TRAUNMÜLLER*
What citizens think about Muslim immigrants has important implications for some of the most pressing
challenges facing Western democracies. To advance contemporary understanding of what ‘Islamophobia’
really is – for example, whether it is a dislike based on immigrants’ ethnic background, religious identity
or specific religious behaviors – this study fielded a representative online survey experiment in the UK in
summer 2015. The results suggest that Muslim immigrants are not per se viewed more negatively than
Christian immigrants. Instead, the study finds evidence that citizens’ uneasiness with Muslim immigration
is first and foremost the result of a rejection of fundamentalist forms of religiosity. This suggests that
common explanations, which are based on simple dichotomies between liberal supporters and con-
servative critics of immigration, need to be re-evaluated. While the politically left and culturally liberal
have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than right-leaning individuals and conservatives, they are
also far more critical of religious groups. The study concludes that a large part of the current political
controversy over Muslim immigration is related to this double opposition: it is less about immigrants ver-
sus natives or even Muslim versus Christians than about political liberalism versus religious
fundamentalism.
Keywords: Islamophobia; ethnicity; religion; religiosity; liberalism; immigration.
What citizens think about Muslim immigrants has important implications for pressing challenges
facing Western democracies: concerns over civic cohesion,1 the acceptance of asylum policy
regimes2 and political responses to terrorism.3 Yet the scholarly discussion thus far has analyzed
citizens’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants based on a general understanding of anti-immigrant
sentiment. We believe this general view fails to capture citizens’ specific attitudes toward Muslim
immigrants, whose traditional religiosity is often viewed as a danger to Western liberal values,
secularism and democracy.
This article argues that the widespread reservations about Muslim immigrants stem first and
foremost from a rejection of fundamentalist forms of religiosity. While this notion has been voiced
on several occasions in political theory,4 it has not been given due empirical consideration and
* University of Bamberg, Department of Political Science and WZB Berlin Social Science Center
(email: marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de); Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute of Political Science and Uni-
versity of Mannheim (email: traunmueller@soz.uni-frankfurt.de). The authors would like to thank Robert Ford,
Marcel Coenders, Anouk Kootstra and Menno van Setten for giving them the opportunity to include their
experiment in their panel survey. Previous versions of this article were presented at workshops at Yale Uni-
versity, the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, the universities of Amsterdam, Mannheim, Neuchatel, Konstanz,
Sankt Gallen and Vienna as well as at the 2017 American Political Science Association meeting and the 2017
International Conference of Europeanists. The authors would like to thank Claire Adida, Mabel Berezin, Cecilia
Mo, Tom van der Meer and Anselm Rink as well as five anonymous reviewers and editor Robert Johns for
valuable comments and suggestions. Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.
org/doi:10.7910/DVN/L2OZPI, and online appendices at: 10.1017/S0007123418000054.
1 Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009.
2 Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016.
3 Sides and Gross 2013.
substantiated with credible evidence. The empirical literature on ‘Islamophobia’5 has simply
assumed that Muslim immigrants are more religious than the majority population and,
importantly, that they are also perceived as such by the citizens of Western democracies.6
To better understand citizens’ views of Muslim immigrants, we need to compare their
attitudes with those toward other religious groups and – most importantly – separate nominal
religion (that is, Muslim vs. Christian) from the type of religiosity (that is, devout, radical or
non-practicing). While some (experimental) survey studies distinguish between Christian and
Muslim religious practices7 or between immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in
particular,8 others hold the ethnicity, country of origin or immigrant status constant in order to
contrast Christians with Muslims.9 All these studies come to the conclusion that Christians are
preferred over Muslims, and thus confirm what has been shown in the literature on immigrant
attitudes in general – namely that cultural distance affects how migrants are perceived.10 But
none of these studies examine anti-religious sentiments: the degree of religiosity is not varied,
and only attitudes toward individuals who are both foreign and belong to a particular religion
are considered. One exception is Wright et al.,11 who distinguish between Muslim women
wearing a headscarf vs. a burka. However their study does not clarify the extent to which the
headscarf and burka reflect different degrees of religiosity, and in any case it concerns only one
specific aspect of religiosity.
To overcome this limitation and to advance our understanding of ‘Islamophobia’ – that is,
whether it is a dislike based on immigrants’ ethnic background, religious identity or specific
religious behavior – we fielded a representative online survey experiment in the UK in summer
2015. The experimental design is based on a full factorial analysis that manipulates the ethnic
background of a fictitious group (Nigerian, Bulgarian or British), their religious identity
(Muslim or Christian) and their religious behavior (non-practicing, devout or radical). This
puts us in the unique position of being able to disentangle the role of traditional religiosity
from ethnicity or immigrant status on the one hand, and nominal religious belonging on
the other.
Our results suggest that in general Muslims are not viewed more negatively than Christian
immigrants from Bulgaria and Nigeria. More interestingly, actual religious behavior is clearly a
more decisive factor than either religious identity or ethnic background. By far the most
negative attitudes are toward religious fundamentalists. While this effect is indeed stronger for
Muslims than it is for Christians, Christian fundamentalists are clearly resented more than the
average practicing Muslim. Therefore we conclude that citizens’ concerns about Muslim
immigration are less about immigrants or religious groups per se than they are about extreme
forms of religiosity.
4 Cesari 2010; Joppke 2015; Nussbaum 2012.
5
‘Islamophobia’ can be defined as ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or
Muslims’ (Bleich 2011, 1581). This definition makes clear that Islamophobia does not denote rational criticism
or disagreement with Islam or Muslim attitudes. We agree with Bleich (2011, 1586) that it instead constitutes an
unnuanced, negative and emotional assessment. Here we question the extent to which this assessment changes
depending on what kind of ‘Muslim’ is evaluated.
6 Brubaker 2013.
7 Carol, Helbling, and Michalowski 2015; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014; Wright et al. 2017.
8 Helbling 2010; Strabac and Listhaug 2008.
9 Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2013; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2014; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016;
Creighton and Jamal 2015.
10 Hagendoorn 1995; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Heath and Cheung 2007.
11 Wright et al. 2017.
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This finding has important implications for our understanding of the current challenges of Muslim
immigration. One of these implications is that overly simplistic explanations of anti-immigrant
sentiments and simple dichotomies between liberal supporters and conservative critics of Muslim
immigration break down. While it is well documented that people with liberal values have more
positive attitudes toward immigrants,12 it has been shown at least for the United States that they are
generally also highly critical of traditional Christian forms of religiosity.13 It can thus be argued that
while liberals are more open to change and care less about collective groups, they see traditional
religion and especially Islam as a threat to liberal values and thus reject religious groups – more so
than their conservative counterparts.
This ‘intolerance of the tolerant’ is exactly what we find in our data. While conservatives hold
more negative attitudes toward immigrants and prefer Christian over Muslim migrants, liberals
generally have more positive attitudes toward immigrants. But they also have a pronounced
dislike for religious groups, regardless of their nominal faith tradition. Conservative and
religious natives, however, have more positive views of religious immigrants than liberal-
secular natives. Nonetheless, traditional conservative and religious values are related to more
negative attitudes toward immigrants.
Our experimental evidence suggests that a large part of the controversy over Muslim
immigration thus stems from the fact that Muslim immigrants face a double opposition: they are
rejected because of their immigrant status and because of their particular type of religious
behavior. In other words, different group characteristics of Muslim immigrants matter to
different degrees to different people, but add up to a general opposition.
Our article contributes to the recent growth in scholarly interest in public attitudes toward
immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular.14 While a series of studies has
sought to explain attitudes toward Muslims,15 these tend to focus on theories explaining
resentment of immigrants in general. Our article supports a more specific argument to
understand opposition toward Muslim immigrants by stressing the religious/cultural nature of
this political conflict.16 Muslim immigrants are not only disliked for their ascriptive
characteristics that cannot be changed but also for their religious behavior, which may be
more susceptible to policy intervention. The current political conflict is only partly between
Muslims and Christians and between immigrants and native citizens. To a large extent it is also
a conflict between political liberalism and religious fundamentalism. We thus also contribute to
the sparse literature on anti-religious sentiments that has so far mostly focused on attitudes
toward Christian fundamentalists or atheists in the United States.17
EXPLAINING ANTI-MUSLIM IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS
The main explanation for anti-immigrant sentiments put forward in the literature is that
immigrants are perceived as a competitive threat to the host society.18 The scholarly debate
mainly revolves around the question of whether this threat is best understood in terms of
12 Flanagan and Lee 2003, 267; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 104.
13 Bolce and de Maio 1999a; Yancey 2010.
14 See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a recent review.
15 Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Saroglou et al. 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Stolz 2006;
Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Van der Noll 2010.
16 Helbling 2012; Helbling and Traunmüller 2016; Koopmans 2013.
17 Bolce and de Maio 1999a; Bolce and de Maio 1999b; Bolce and de Maio 2008; Gervais 2011; Gervais,
Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011; Yancey 2010.
18 Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995.
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economic resources or cultural identities, and tends to favor the latter.19 Whereas economic
concerns subsume fears over increased labor market competition as well as strains on social
security systems,20 cultural concerns evolve around issues of national identity, shared values
and social cohesion that may be threatened by immigrants.21
More recently, several scholars have developed more specific ‘cultural threat’ arguments to
explain negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants to Europe. Some consider Muslims’ cultural
beliefs on gender roles or sexual orientation to be incompatible with the liberal and secular
lifestyles in these countries.22 Others argue that the supposed secularism of European liberal
democracy, both in terms of the rules of the game of public life and of collective identities, has
been overstated.23 Instead, they state that Muslim immigration threatens the collective identities in
European host societies because these identities are deeply rooted in Christian traditions. When a
society’s political, social and cultural life is defined by strong references to religious tradition,
religious minorities pose a direct ‘religious threat’ to this collective identity.24
Either way, accommodating Muslim immigrants into European societies often involves
changing the existing rules as well as the loss of longstanding traditions, valuable privileges and
maybe even everyday habits. Not only do many citizens prefer the status quo and are
uncomfortable with change; they also view Muslim newcomers as a threat to their way of
life and react with animosity to their practices and demands. Of course, negative reactions to the
Muslim community may also be rooted in the perceived security threats associated with Islamic
terrorism.25
Our theoretical argument builds and expands on these perspectives. Like others before us, we
stress the fundamental role of cultural threat in our explanation of anti-Muslim attitudes. And
like others, we argue that Muslim immigrants’ religiosity – their religious ideas, practices and
claims for religious rights – are the decisive features of this particular group that trigger
the feelings of cultural threat in citizens of the host society. We reconcile the perspectives
of ‘cultural threat’ and ‘religious threat’ by pointing out that Muslim immigrants pose
different types of threats to different segments of the native population. Importantly, and
going beyond existing studies, we devise an experimental design that allows us to disentangle
the role of traditional religiosity from ethnicity on the one hand, and nominal religion on
the other.
THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RELIGIOSITY
In a nutshell, we contend that what drives citizens’ antipathy toward Muslim immigrants is
primarily a dislike of ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘radical’ forms of religiosity. Muslim immigrants not
only have a different ethnic and religious background; they are also more religious, and
sometimes their religiosity takes on very traditional forms. Several studies show that Muslim
immigrants are more religious than the average citizen in their host societies.26 Koopmans
studies six Western European countries and finds that while 44 per cent of foreign- and native-
19 Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Sides and
Citrin 2007; Tingley 2013.
20 Scheve and Slauter 2001.
21 Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004.
22 Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016; Helbling 2014; Saroglou et al. 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007;
Van der Noll 2010.
23 Helbling and Traunmüller 2016.
24 Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Sommer 2013; Campbell 2006.
25 Cesari 2004; Wike and Grim 2010.
26 Connor 2010; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009.
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born Muslim immigrants have fundamentalist attitudes, only 4 per cent of Christian natives can
be considered fundamentalist.27
Citizens often perceive Muslims as more religious or fundamentalist than Christians, and are
presented as such by the media. Fischer et al.28 show that many think Muslims are more
intrinsically religious and identify more with their religion than Christians. Pew Forum finds
that in Western publics, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about
Muslim minorities.29 According to this study, 61 per cent of the UK population believes that
Muslims want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation’s customs and way
of life. A further 63 per cent think that the Islamic identity of resident Muslims in the UK is
growing stronger. Saeed30 concludes that in British public discourse Muslims are often linked to
fundamentalism. According to Eid, Western media31 presents Muslims as a homogeneous
community rooted in fanaticism and oppression.
Traditional religiosity and religious fundamentalism are seen as a threat because their values
run counter to modernity.32 Whereas modern values emphasize individual freedom, gender
equality and political secularism,33 all of which had to be wrestled from religious authorities in
the past, radical religiosity rejects these cultural and political manifestations of modernity. It is
‘a discernable pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled “true believers” attempt to
arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create
viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors’.34 Fundamentalists believe that one
should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the holy scriptures, that
these rules allow only one interpretation that is binding for all, and that religious rules should
have priority over secular laws.35 To the extent that religious fundamentalists do not merely
withdraw from general society but seek to actively shape it in accordance with their religious
views, they pose a considerable challenge to the prevailing social and political order.
This role of traditional religiosity is important for our understanding of anti-Muslim sentiments.
Muslim immigrants face a double opposition in the public because they trigger different fears and
feelings of dislike in different segments of the population. Whereas conservative and politically
right-leaning citizens are more critical of immigrants and Islam in general, they hold more
favorable views toward traditional religiosity. Liberal and politically left-leaning citizens, however,
are open to immigrants and members of different faiths, but they tend to be critical of the values
associated with traditional forms of religion. The divide ‘over lifestyle and cultural dominance
issues such as abortion, gay rights, gender roles, and the place of religion in the public sphere’
makes liberals oppose religious fundamentalists.36 This leads to an uneasy situation in which
different citizens dislike Muslim immigrants for quite different reasons.
Some research supports the claim that liberals generally dislike fundamentalist or extreme
forms of religiosity. Yancey finds that factors that explain positive attitudes toward out-groups –
such as education or political ideology – have inverse effects on attitudes toward Christian
fundamentalists: ‘the characteristics that predict acceptance of nontraditional religious groups
27 Koopmans 2015.
28 Fischer, Greitemeyer, and Kastenmüller 2007.
29 Pew Forum 2005.
30 Saeed 2007.
31 Eid 2014, 102.
32 Marty and Appleby 1991; Marty and Appleby 1994.
33 Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005.
34 Almond et al. 2003, 17.
35 Koopmans 2015.
36 Bolce and de Maio 1999b, 511.
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are inversely correlated to rejection of fundamentalists’.37 Bolce and de Maio38 come to
similar conclusions and show that anti-fundamentalist attitudes are especially widespread
among highly educated and secular persons. This confirms the study by Hyers and Hyers,39
who show that Christian fundamentalists feel discriminated against in secular universities.
According to Yancey,40 fundamentalists are seen as a danger to the development of
progressive values. They are viewed as conservative, intolerant and culturally backwards. It
remains an open question, however, whether these resentments themselves constitute cultural
or religious prejudices or an attempt to defend democratic, pluralistic values.41 Most likely,
they are both.
With regard to traditional Muslim religiosity, Helbling42 shows that while people with liberal
values have more positive attitudes toward Muslims than those with conservative values, this
effect disappears when it comes to the acceptance of the Muslim headscarf. In a similar vein, in
several countries support for banning the full Islamic veil is evenly distributed across education
levels and political ideologies, and is even greater among high-income groups.43 The headscarf
may be perceived as a religious symbol and therefore be opposed due to anti-religious
sentiments or the rejection of traditional forms of religiosity. It is also often seen as a symbol of
gender inequality and the oppression of women. Sniderman and Hagendoorn44 show that the
role of women and the general lack of self-determination in traditional Muslim societies is a
frequent liberal criticism of Islam.
In sum, and given previous research, we expect that people with liberal values generally have
more positive attitudes toward immigrants than conservatives, irrespective of their cultural/
religious background. However, when it comes to migrants who are religious or even radical
(irrespective of whether they are Christians or Muslims) this positive attitude disappears and
concerns over the loss of liberal values trump general tolerance.
Apart from triggering the ‘intolerance of the tolerant’, the traditional religiosity of Muslim
immigrants may also reveal the ‘tolerance of the intolerant’. Religious people are usually more
conservative, and fundamentalists more right-wing authoritarian.45 Whether religiosity leads to
negative or positive attitudes toward out-groups has been disputed for a long time.46 Recent
empirical studies suggest that agnosticism leads to more tolerance47 and that religiosity leads to
more negative attitudes toward migrants and more ethnocentrism.48 Others show that religiosity
does not lead to out-group hostility when one controls for fundamentalist ideas.49 It thus appears
that it is mainly fundamentalism that is related to prejudices against other minorities, including
ethnic and racial minorities.50
However, if liberals reject traditional religiosity, it is plausible to assume that religious natives
will show solidarity toward religious immigrants since they too constitute a marginalized group in
37 Yancey 2010, 165.
38 Bolce and de Maio 1999a.
39 Hyers and Hyers 2008.
40 Yancey 2010, 161–2.
41 Bolce and de Maio 1999a, 55; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999, 520.
42 Helbling 2010; Helbling 2014.
43 Pew 2010.
44 Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 32–6.
45 Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005, 391; Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010, 127; Norris and Inglehart 2004, 196–212.
46 Allport 1979; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015.
47 Hunsberger and Jackson 2005.
48 Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010, 127.
49 Kirkpatrick 1993.
50 Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 2002.
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secular and liberal societies.51 This leads us to expect that for religious natives, negative attitudes
toward immigrants in general are reduced if these immigrants are religious themselves. Given
previous research, we expect them to resent migrants in general more than non-religious people,
as they are more conservative. However, we expect these negative attitudes to decrease when it




To test our argument about the role of religiosity in attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, we
conducted an online survey experiment that asked respondents to indicate their feelings toward
randomly assigned groups. The experimental design was based on a full factorial analysis52 that
manipulated the immigrant status of a fictitious group (immigrants from Bulgaria, Nigeria or
native Britons), their religious denomination (Muslim or Christian) and their degree of
religiosity (non-practicing, devout or radical) (see Appendix Table A1 for an overview of all
combinations of vignettes).53 The vignette study was part of a larger UK representative panel
survey of almost 4,500 respondents, fielded in June 2015 and executed by YouGov.54 We only
included respondents who identify as White British in our analyses. This group makes up 90 per
cent of the sample. Within this group, only fifty-three persons indicated that they were not
Christian, and five reported that their religion was Islam.
Each respondent received one vignette that reads as follows (the underlined parts were
randomly varied across respondents, see Appendix Table A2 for all question wordings.):
‘Now we are interested in your opinion regarding some groups that are currently active in
social and political life in Great Britain. Imagine a group of immigrants from Nigeria who are
devout Muslims who regularly go to the mosque and regularly pray at home. Members of this
group want to hold public rallies and demonstrations for a better recognition of their interests in
Britain.’
We restricted our study to Muslims and Christians, as the former constitute a major and
controversial immigration group in Great Britain (and most Western European countries)
and the latter represents the traditional majority religion in Great Britain.55 We described
migrants as coming from either Bulgaria or Nigeria as we wanted to select countries where
both Muslims and Christians live to make the vignettes realistic (this would preclude
51 Fetzer 2000, 6.
52 Auspurg and Hinz 2015.
53 The total vignette population was used, and thus each category within a manipulation has an equal chance
of being selected for a final vignette.
54 90 per cent of the interviews were conducted between 4 and 17 June 2015. YouGov uses a panel of over
360,000 British adults. It selects a sub-sample of the panel that is representative of the general national British
population in terms of age, gender, social class, region, party identification and newspaper readership. The data
are weighted using the census, the National Readership survey and YouGov estimates of an analysis of more than
80,000 responses to questions about party identification to a YouGov survey at the 2010 general election.
Selected panelists are invited by email to visit a website where they can answer the survey (only once) and
receive a small cash reward. For more information on their panel methodology see: https://yougov.co.uk/about/
panel-methodology/.
55 We decided not to differentiate between different Muslim and Christian groups such as Shiites/Sunnis and
Catholics/Protestants in order to avoid overloading our vignette design and (more importantly) because the main
arguments in the social science literature and public debates turn on a general clash between Muslims and
Christians. For these reasons we also decided not to include other religious groups such as Hindus, for example.
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Pakistan, for instance). In Nigeria, Muslims make up roughly 40 per cent and in Bulgaria 10
per cent of the population. Moreover, both nationalities constitute important migrant groups
in Great Britain. We refrained from including more controversial immigration groups such
as migrants from Arabic countries that are often related to terrorism, as respondents might
already have very strong opinions about these groups, and since the effects of perceived or
real security threats are not part of our study. Syrians were not included, as they did not
make up an important group of migrants (or asylum seekers) in Great Britain at the time of
the data collection, which took place a couple of months before the refugee crisis from that
country started.
Due to its colonial past, there have been large migration flows from Nigeria to Britain over
the last five years. While the Bulgarian community in Britain was rather small for a long time,
the EU enlargements in the mid-2000s have led to increased immigration from Eastern Europe,
including Bulgaria. Differentiating between Bulgarian and Nigerian migrants also allows us to
vary cultural distance and to differentiate between EU and non-EU migrants. We also included
vignettes that described the groups as natives to have a reference group and to better compare
the effect of ethnicity to the effect of religion and religiosity.
Since respondents might have different understandings of what the different degrees of
religiosity mean, we provided short definitions in the survey, which allows us to guarantee a
higher degree of internal validity. In line with the literature, we differentiate between three
degrees of religiosity that are defined as follows: non-practicing (persons who never go to
church/mosque and never pray), devout (people who regularly go to church/mosque and
regularly pray) and radicals (people who think there is only one interpretation of the Bible/
Koran, and that it is more important than British laws).
Of course, it is still possible that people connote additional meanings with these three labels.
For example, although we define radicalism as an extreme form of religiosity, some respondents
may think of terrorism when they hear this term. This is, however, a general problem with
several terms used in the vignettes. As Sides and Gross56 convincingly demonstrate, groups
simply described as ‘Muslims’ or ‘Muslim-Americans’ are seen as more violent, even without
the specification ‘radical’. Our study aims to deal with this problem and to disentangle the
different meanings and perceptions about Muslims by separating nominal belonging from actual
types of religious behavior.
MAIN DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
After another vignette on the authorities’ decision to either ban or permit these public
demonstrations, which we used for another analysis,57 we asked respondents to indicate their
general feelings about the group described in the vignette:
‘Now we would like to know what your general feelings are about this group. We’d like you to rate
them with a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel
favourably and warm toward them; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel
favourably toward them and that you don’t care too much for them. If you don’t feel particularly
warm or cold toward them you would rate them at 50 degrees.’
The feeling thermometer score constitutes our dependent variable. It reflects the general
attitudes toward the groups that are presented in the vignettes and varies between 0 (very
56 Sides and Gross 2013, 587.
57 Traunmüller and Helbling (2017). In additional analyses, we also controlled for this manipulation. It has no
direct effect on our dependent variable and does not change any of our findings.
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negative) to 100 (very positive). As documented in Appendix Table A3, which provides
summary statistics, the mean attitude toward all groups is 38.58 The feeling thermometer allows
us to measure Islamophobia, which we define as an unnuanced, negative and emotional
assessment of Muslims. The feeling thermometer also allows us to make very fine-grained
distinctions, which is of particular importance for subjective variables that ‘can perhaps be
thought of in terms of a continuum that reflect direction and intensity and perhaps even have a
“zero” or neutral point’.59
Our key independent variables are the three characteristics that we presented to the
respondents and that varied across the vignettes (nationality, religion, religiosity). The variables
are coded 1 if a respondent received a vignette with the respective characteristic and 0 if not.
One-third of the respondents received the native frame, and two-thirds one of the two immigrant
frames (Bulgarians/Nigerians). Half of the respondents received the Christian and the other half
the Muslim frame. Finally, each of the three religiosity frames was assigned to one-third of the
sample, respectively (see Appendix Tables A1 and A3).
FURTHER VARIABLES
We further measured respondents’ degree of liberalism and religiosity. We used two alternative
measures to measure liberal/conservative attitudes. The first is a simple left–right scale.
Respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale from 1 (very left-wing) to 7 (very
right-wing). As we present in Table A3, left- and right-wing voters are evenly distributed in this
sample with a mean value of 3.97. For some of the analyses we split the respondents into two
groups – those who take positions left or right of the center (that is, with scores smaller or
greater than 4). Each of the two groups makes up roughly 35 per cent of the sample.
The second measure of cultural liberalism is an index built from three items. Respondents
were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (liberal) to 5 (conservative) how much they (dis-)agree
with the statements that it is better if women with young children do not work, that in Britain
men and women interact in an overly unreserved way, and that they prefer to have homosexuals
among their friends. On average, the group of people with liberal values is a little larger than the
group with conservative values. This appears in Table A3 that indicates a mean value of 2.4. For
some of the analyses the scale is split at the mean to differentiate between liberals and
conservatives (smaller or greater than 2.4).
In order to capture respondents’ religiosity we distinguish between the same three groups as
in the vignettes. To measure religiosity we asked the respondents to indicate on a scale from 1 to
11 how religious they see themselves, regardless of whether they belong to a particular religion.
In a second question they were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 how often they attend
religious services apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals. We built an index
from the average of these two items (α = 0.68). We consider respondents to be devout if they
score greater than the mean of this measure.
To measure radicalism, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5 to what
extent they (dis-)agree with the statements that there is only one interpretation of religious rules
and every religious person must stick to that, and that religious rules are more important to
them than British laws. We again built an index combining these two items (α = 0.63). We
58 Table A3 includes summary statistics on the key variables used in the analyses in this study. The average
respondent is 50 years old (range 18–96, SD = 15.8). Exactly half of the sample is women; 47 per cent have a
university degree or another higher qualification. Including these characteristics in our models does not affect the
results in any substantial way.
59 Alwin 1997, 324.
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defined radicals as respondents who at least partly agree with both statements (same or greater
than 3.5). This group makes up around 5 per cent of the sample. This roughly corresponds to
the 4 per cent of Christian fundamentalists that Koopmans found in six Western European
countries.60
RESULTS
Ethnicity, Religion or Religiosity?
Figure 1 presents the average feeling thermometer scores that respondents gave toward the
groups we differentiate in our survey experiment. The average feeling thermometer score across
all groups is around 38 (vertical gray line). The key comparison we are interested in is the
difference in attitudes toward Christians (white circles) and Muslims (black triangles),61 and
how this difference behaves when the groups are described as more or less religious and





















Fig. 1. Feeling thermometer scores toward different social groups defined by immigrant status, religion and
religiosity
Note: the key comparison is the difference in attitudes toward Christians (white circles) and Muslims (black
triangles), which is indicated by the horizontal line segments. The vertical gray line shows the average
feeling across all groups.
60 Koopmans 2015.
61 Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2013.
62 We combine immigrants from Bulgaria and Nigeria because, contrary to our expectations, additional
analyses (not presented here) show that the average attitudes toward these two groups are virtually indis-
tinguishable. We do not have a specific explanation for this phenomenon. It might be that although Nigerians are
culturally more distant than Bulgarians they are still familiar to British natives as they come from a former colony
and have been in Britain for longer than Bulgarians. Cultural distance and familiarity effects might therefore
cancel each other out. The fact that race and skin color no longer play a role in modern industrialized societies
has also been shown in experiments conducted by Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2010) in France and by Valentino
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The experimental results support our argument concerning the role of traditional religiosity in
understanding citizens’ attitudes toward Muslim immigration. First of all, if we focus on groups
of native British who are either non-practicing or moderately religious, citizens do not have
significantly different feelings toward Muslims and Christians. For completely secular groups
the difference in feeling thermometer scores is only −3.8 [95 per cent CI: −8.26, 0.38] and for
devout groups only −2.8 [− 7.39, 1.27]. Secondly, we find that non-practicing and devout
immigrant groups are only slightly less liked than natives. More importantly, Muslim
immigrants are not necessarily resented more than Christians. Quite to the contrary, regarding
non-practicing immigrants, Muslims are even liked a bit more than their Christian counterparts
(4.2 [1.53, 6.71]). This empirical evidence clearly suggests that, controlling for religiosity,
citizens are not concerned with the difference between Muslims and Christians per se. But this
changes once religiosity enters the picture. For devout immigrants the difference between
Muslims and Christians is significant (−6.7 [− 9.45, −3.90]), indicating some reservations
against Muslims’ religiosity.
Thirdly, and in line with our argument, citizens have a pronounced dislike for radical forms
of religiosity. Fundamentalist religious groups receive markedly lower feeling thermometer
scores than all other groups. This holds for both Muslims and Christians as well as for
immigrants and natives. Importantly, citizens view native Christians who are fundamentalists
less favorably than they view Muslim immigrants who are simply devout practitioners of their
faith (the difference is −10.9 [− 14.35, −7.28]). This evidence supports the notion that a
social group’s particular religious behavior – and not only its immigrant status or faith
tradition – is the key determinant that drives citizens’ likes or dislikes. However, Muslim
fundamentalists are clearly the least liked group of all. Among natives, the difference in feelings
toward Muslim and Christian radicals is quite pronounced and significant (−11 [− 15.2, −6.97]).
The same holds for radical immigrant groups, where Muslims are also less liked than Christians
(−7.9 [ − 10.8, −5.22]). These findings make clear how important it is to differentiate between
different types of Muslim immigrants, and that they are not generally seen in a more negative
light than other immigrants. Instead, it is fundamentalist religiosity that produces negative
attitudes.
CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL VIEWS ON MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS
Having established the role of traditional religiosity in anti-immigrant sentiment, we now turn to
the question of how respondents’ political ideology and values interact with immigrants’ group
characteristics. To allow for alternative measurements of ‘conservatism’ and ‘liberalism’, we
group respondents using a left–right ideology scale as well as an index for cultural liberalism.
We present the results in Figure 2. Here, the key comparison is the difference in feeling
thermometer scores between politically right-leaning or conservative respondents and their left-
leaning or liberal counterparts. The horizontal line segments indicate the difference between
these respondent types. Full regression models with multiplicative interaction terms are
documented in Appendix Table A4.
The experimental findings suggest that differences in political ideology and liberal values are
clearly related to different feelings toward different social groups. First, and in line with our
(F’note continued)
et al. (2018b) in eleven countries in Asia, Australia, North America and Western Europe (see, however,
Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2018a). It might also be, as one reviewer suggested, that race or skin color
becomes irrelevant once a person is seen as a member of an ethnic out-group.
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expectations, citizens who identify themselves as politically left and who hold culturally liberal
views have significantly warmer feelings toward immigrants. When compared to right-leaning
and conservative citizens, the respective differences in thermometer scores are 9 [95 per cent CI:
12.4, 5.59] and 3.2 [6.1, 0.3]. Secondly, in general they also have significantly more positive
views of Muslims (in fact, they even view Muslims more favorably than Christians, also see
Appendix Table A1). The differences between left/liberals and right/conservatives are 9.7 [12.9,
6.4] and 7.3 [10.0, 4.6] points on the feeling thermometer, respectively.
Thirdly, however, left-leaning and culturally liberal respondents have less warm feelings for
religiously devout groups. The differences when compared to the right-leaning and more
conservative citizens are significant (4.8 [0.8, 8.8] and 4.6 [1.3, 8.0]). This finding is even more
pronounced when we look at attitudes toward radical groups. Although both left/liberals and
right/conservatives have rather cool feelings toward fundamentalist religious groups, they are
markedly less liked by the political left and culturally liberal. The differences between
ideological camps are statistically significant and roughly twice as large as the ones found for
devout groups: 9.5 [5.5, 13.4] and 9.2 [5.9, 12.5].
This finding has an important implication: if it were the case that respondents’ negative
reactions to religious radicalism were merely the product of security concerns, and that
respondents simply equated radicalism with ‘terrorism’, we would expect conservatives to react
much more negatively to religious radicals than liberals. This is so because, arguably,
conservatives are far more concerned with issues of national security than liberals. But this
pattern is not at all what we see in our data: liberals – who place less emphasis on national
security – have more negative feelings about religious radicals than conservatives do. We argue
that this has to be explained by reference to cultural concerns.
Additional analyses of the effects of native respondents’ religiosity produce similar patterns (see




























Fig. 2. How respondents’ political ideologies and values interact with group characteristics
Note: we report average feeling thermometer scores. Results are based on the regression models documented
in Appendix Table A4. The key comparison is the difference in feeling thermometer scores between
politically right-leaning or conservative (white circles) and left-leaning or liberal respondents (black triangles).
The horizontal line segments indicate the difference between these respondent types.
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on anti-immigrant sentiment. Yet devout citizens have significantly more positive feelings toward
religious groups than secular citizens. And fundamentalist citizens have significantly warmer
feelings than regularly practicing citizens. This pattern holds for both devout and radical immigrant
groups. This again may indicate that radicalism is not simply equated with security threats. Native
Christian radicals would be expected to be as concerned as non-religious natives.
Figure 3 takes the analysis one step further and presents the interaction of respondents’
political ideology and cultural values with immigrants’ religion and religiosity. As before, we
find that radical religious groups are always less liked than merely devout groups, no matter
whether they are Muslim or Christian. And this general pattern holds for both leftist/liberals
and rightist/conservative respondents. However, respondents who consider themselves
politically left or culturally liberal discriminate less between the two faith traditions: for
them, only a group’s actual religiosity is decisive. Since Christian radicals, at least in the
European context, are not associated with terror, this again points to cultural and not merely
security concerns. Right-wing and conservative respondents, however, have a clear preference
for Christian groups. They like devout Christians more than devout Muslims and fundamentalist
Christians more than fundamentalist Muslims. No such pattern can be observed for secular
groups.
CONCLUSION
Muslim immigrants to Western democracies tend to be more traditionally religious than the
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Fig. 3. How respondents’ political ideologies and values interact with religious immigrant characteristics
Note: we report average feeling thermometer scores. The results are based on the regression models
documented in Appendix Table A5. The key comparison is the difference in feeling thermometer scores
between politically right-leaning or conservative (white circles) and left-leaning or liberal respondents (black
triangles). The horizontal line segments indicate the difference between these respondent types.
63 Connor 2010; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009.
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such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’, but also in their actual religious behavior. We argue that
Muslim immigrants’ religiosity is the key to explaining citizens’ attitudes toward this particular
immigrant group. While this argument can be found in political theory,64 it has not yet been
established by empirical evidence. Several studies that have investigated attitudes toward
Muslims or compared attitudes toward both Christian and Muslim immigrants have also made
similar claims.65 But none of these studies has directly addressed the degree of religiosity of
Muslims; they have simply assumed that people see Muslims as religious. Based on the results
of a survey experiment, we provide such evidence and show that citizens’ uneasiness with
Muslim immigration is indeed first and foremost the result of a rejection of fundamentalist
forms of religiosity.
Our results contribute to our understanding of citizens’ anti-immigrant sentiments because
they suggest that common explanations, which are based on simple dichotomies between liberal
supporters and conservative critics of immigration, need to be re-evaluated. We find that while
all three characteristics – ethnicity, religion and religiosity – affect citizens’ feelings toward
immigrants, they do so to quite different degrees for different people. While the politically left
and culturally liberal have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than right-leaning
individuals and conservatives, they are also far more critical of religious groups. Therefore, we
conclude that a large part of the current political controversy over Muslim immigration has to do
with a double opposition: Muslim immigrants are met with reservation by some because of their
immigrant status or religious belonging, and from others because of their particular type of
religious behavior, which is often seen as incompatible with liberal and democratic values.
Although we expect to find similar patterns in other Western countries, our experimental
evidence remains restricted to the UK and thus we cannot exclude the possibility that context
matters. As Helbling and Traunmüller66 have recently demonstrated in a comparative study, the
political regulation of religion is related to citizens’ attitudes toward Muslims and their religious
demands. It might be interesting to investigate the extent to which these policies also affect how
people differentiate between different forms of religiosity. The public role of religion also sets
European states apart from the United States, where religion is less regulated yet Christian
religious fundamentalism is more widespread. In line with our argument, we would assume that
this suggests a higher acceptance rate of fundamentalist religiosity at the aggregate level. It is,
however, rather unlikely that such a situation would also produce more positive attitudes among
liberals. As several studies have already shown, liberals have particularly hostile attitudes
toward Christian fundamentalists in the United States.67 There is little reason to believe that this
might be different for Muslim fundamentalists. At the same time, Muslim immigrants in the
United States may come from different countries of origin, mostly the Middle East, which may
introduce further concerns about security threats.68
An important implication of our results is that they stress the importance of differentiating
between different kinds of Muslim immigrants, and that citizens do not always see them in a more
negative light than they would other immigrant groups. This is crucial to know, as the majority of
Muslim immigrants are not fundamentalists.69 For one, this supports Brubaker’s recent argument
that Muslims are ‘not a homogeneous and solidary group but a heterogeneous category’ and
64 Cesari 2010; Joppke 2015; Nussbaum 2012.
65 Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2013, 2014; Creighton and Jamal 2015; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009.
66 Helbling and Traunmüller 2016.
67 Bolce and de Maio 1999a; Bolce and de Maio 1999b; Bolce and de Maio 2008; Gervais 2011; Gervais,
Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011; Yancey 2010.
68 Wike and Grim 2010.
69 Koopmans 2015.
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should be treated as such in research.70 At a minimum, this involves the need to separate religious
identity from actual religious behavior, and to recognize that Muslim identity cannot be equated
with traditional forms of religious values and practices without losing analytical clarity.
Our findings also contribute to a better understanding Islamophobia by providing a more
nuanced view of the religious/cultural nature of the political conflict surrounding Muslim
immigration to Western democracies.71 Increasing inflows of Muslim immigrants in recent
decades have highlighted the importance of dealing with religious customs and claims for
religious rights. Muslim immigrants are not disliked per se. In fact, secular Muslim immigrants
are not viewed more negatively than non-religious Christian immigrants at all. The current
political conflict is not about Muslims versus Christians or immigrants versus natives, but about
political liberalism versus religious fundamentalism. We have suggested here that radical
religion is mainly rejected on cultural grounds because it is seen as incompatible with modern
cultural and political values. But of course, radical religion may also be perceived as a security
threat, as is clearly the case with international Islamic terrorism. We hope future experimental
designs will be better able to address this possibility and allow us to further disentangle the
sources of anti-Muslim sentiment.
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